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BANKRUPTCY DECISIONMAKING:
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF CONTINUATION BIAS IN
SMALL BUSINESS BANKRUPTCIES
Edward R. Morrison†
Columbia Law School

Abstract
Over half of all small businesses reorganizing under Chapter 11 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code are ultimately liquidated. Little is known about this
shutdown decision and about the factors that increase or reduce the
amount of time a firm spends in bankruptcy. It is widely suspected, how‐
ever, that the Chapter 11 process exhibits a ʺcontinuation bias,ʺ allowing
non‐viable firms to linger under the protection of the court. This paper
tests for the presence of continuation bias in the docket of a typical bank‐
ruptcy court over the course of a calendar year. A variety of tests are em‐
ployed, including the extent to which entrenched managers dominate the
bankruptcy process, the accuracy and speed with which viable and nonvi‐
able firms are distinguished, and the extent to which the hazard of shut‐
down is consistent with the implications of a simple, formal model of the
optimal Chapter 11 process. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the paper
finds that continuation bias is either absent or empirically unimportant.
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1

Introduction
Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code is commonly thought inefficient. The

Code gives managers of distressed corporations a nonwaivable right to file a
bankruptcy petition and thereby halt all creditor collection efforts for months (or years)
as they draft and then negotiate a plan of reorganization. The process of drafting and
negotiating a plan is costly. It generates direct administrative costs ranging from two to
ten percent of firm value.1 More importantly, it generates indirect costs.2 Firms that
should be liquidated are allowed to linger on indefinitely. Chapter 11 prevents or
retards the reallocation of the assets even when a failing firm’s assets may have greater
value in the hands of another owner.3 Rent‐seeking competition among secured and
unsecured creditors4 dominates a process overseen by civil servants (judges) who lack
business training and are biased in favor of preserving firms that should be liquidated.5
These ex post inefficiencies—which characterize both large firm6 and small firm7

1 Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, & Ning Zhu, The Costs of Bankruptcy: Chapter 7 Liquidation vs.

Chapter 11 Reorganization, J. Fin. (forthcoming 2006) (estimates based on administrative costs in
both small and large firm bankruptcies).
2 Tim C. Opler and Sheridan Titman, Financial Distress and Corporate Performance, 49 J.

Fin. 1015 (1994).
3 Edith S. Hotchkiss, Postbankruptcy Performance and Management Turnover, 50 J. Fin. 3

(1995).
4 Arturo Bris, Ivo Welch, & Alan Schwartz, Who Should Pay for Bankruptcy Costs?, J. Legal

Stud. (forthcoming); Lucien Arye Bebchuk and Howard F. Chang, Bargaining and the Division of
Value in Corporate Reorganization, 8 J. L., Econ. & Org. 253 (1992); Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy
Case for Corporate Reorganization, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127 (1986).
5 George Triantis, Financial Slack Policy and the Law of Secured Transactions, 29 J. Legal

Stud 35, 67 (2000); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Law and Finance of Bank and Insurance Insolvency Regu‐
lation, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 723, 780 n.5 (1998); Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy
Law 220‐21 (1986).
6 Lawrence A. Weiss and Karen Wruck, Information Problems, Conflicts of Interest, and As‐

set‐Stripping: Chapter 11’s Failure in the Case of Eastern Airlines, 48 J. Fin. Econ. 55 (1998).
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cases—increase the cost of capital ex ante.8
This paper challenges this traditional view as it applies to small business Chapter
11s.9 Using a sample of all corporate Chapter 11 filings in Chicago during 1998,10 this
paper suggests that the costs, both direct and indirect, of small business Chapter 11s are
quite small. Nearly sixty percent of these firms were shut down (they were liquidated
under Chapter 7 or had their petitions dismissed, allowing liquidation under state law).
Half the firms that failed to emerge intact were shut down within three months of filing.
Seventy percent were shut down in five months. For the firms that failed, the Chapter
11 process was remarkably short. As a general matter, it took no more time than rival
procedures.11

7 Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control—Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the

Bankruptcy Code?, 57 Am. Bankr. L. J. 99 & 247, 272‐73 (1983). See also Philippe Aghion, Oliver
Hart, and John Moore, Improving Bankruptcy Procedure, 72 Wash. U. Law Quart. 849, 871 (1994)
(explaining that their proposal for bankruptcy reform may “have a role to play in the case of
small companies”).
8 Alan Schwartz, Contracting About Bankruptcy, 13 J. Law, Econ, & Org. 127 (1997).
9 Small businesses make up the vast majority of the filings. Other recent empirical work,

although not focusing on small business Chapter 11s, reinforces the view that the costs of reor‐
ganization are not as large as usually thought. See, e.g., Vojislav Maksimovic and Gordon Phil‐
lips, Asset Efficiency and Reallocation Decisions of Bankrupt Firms, 53 J. Fin. 1495 (1998); Gregor
Andrade and Steven N. Kaplan, How Costly is Financial (Not Economic) Distress? Evidence from
Highly Leveraged Transactions That Became Distressed, 53 J. Fin. 1443 (1998); Stuart C. Gilson,
Transaction Costs and Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Financially Distressed Firms, 52 J. Fin.
161 (1997).
10 The filings were lodged in the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois,

Eastern Division, whose jurisdiction encompasses Chicago and outlying areas.
11 A mandatory auction regime would likely take between two and six months. See Bob

Adams, Small‐Business Start Up (1996). See also Karin Thorburn, Bankruptcy Auctions: Costs, Debt
Recovery, and Firm Survival, 58 J. Fin. Econ. 337 (2000) (evidence that Swedish auctions take be‐
tween 1.5 months (median firm) and 2.4 months (mean)). Other commonly proposed alterna‐
tives to Chapter 11 similarly contemplate a process that takes several months to run. See, e.g.,
Philippe Aghion Oliver Hart and John Moore, The Economics of Bankruptcy Reform, 8 J.L. Econ. &
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Moreover, again contrary to conventional accounts, the Chapter 11 process sorts
effectively between firms that are viable and those that are not. Sources of bias
commonly ascribed to the system are largely absent. Neither debtors (managers or
equity‐holders) nor creditors dominate the bankruptcy process. Instead, bankruptcy
judges play a major role in filtering failing firms from viable ones, and they appear to be
able to do this job well. The firms that are quickly liquidated exhibit characteristics of
economic distress (e.g., being unable to pay ongoing expenses even after obtaining
bankruptcy protection); reorganized firms display characteristics of financial distress
(e.g., overexpansion). Finally, the patterns characterizing the duration to shutdown—
non‐monotonicity of the hazard rate and an inverse correlation between the hazard rate
and the volatility of earnings—are consistent with an economic model of optimal
decisionmaking.12 Taken together, these findings suggest that the Chapter 11 process in
small‐business cases has significantly lower cost and displays significantly less bias
than commonly thought.
The paper’s findings are based on data from small business bankruptcy filings,
which prevents generalizability to cases involving large corporations, such as Conseco,
Kmart, and United Airlines.13 The data, however, are well‐suited to studying the costs
of and potential bias in the Chapter 11 process. Small businesses have relatively simple
operations and capital structures and the probability of shutdown in bankruptcy

Org. 523 (1992) (contemplating a process that takes 4 months).
12 This model was described by Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy

Decision‐Making, 17 J. L., Econ., & Org. 356 (2001) and developed more formally in Edward R.
Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision‐Making: An Empirical Study of Small‐Business Bankruptcies, Unpub‐
lished Dissertation, Univ. Chicago (2003); Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Optimal
Timing and Legal Decision‐Making: The Case of the Liquidation Decision in Bankruptcy, John M. Olin
Law & Economics Working Paper No. 86 (Univ. Chicago 1999).
13 These cases, like those studied in this paper, were filed in the Northern District of Illi‐

nois.
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exceeds 50 percent (shutdown is a rare event in large corporate bankruptcies).
Additionally, small businesses make up at least 85 percent of all Chapter 11 filings.14
The findings presented here, then, shed light on the bankruptcy process in the vast
majority of cases.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and presents
summary statistics. Section 3 shows that the data are inconsistent with conventional
accounts of continuation bias. Section 4 examines the same data again with a formal
model of the shutdown decision in Chapter 11 cases and again finds little evidence of
bias. Section 5 concludes.
2

Data Sources
The data used in this paper were drawn from the case files of the Northern

District of Illinois, Eastern Division (“Northern District”) and from the records of the
Secretary of State of Illinois. The Northern District was chosen because of its size, its
similarity to other jurisdictions, and the availability of data. The Northern District’s
jurisdiction encompasses Chicago, Cook County, and outlying areas—a primarily
metropolitan area similar to the Northern and Central Districts of California (covering
Los Angeles and San Francisco), the Northern and Southern Districts of Texas (covering
Dallas and Houston), and the District of New Jersey and Eastern District of
Pennsylvania (covering Atlantic City and Philadelphia).15 Like these jurisdictions, the
Northern District of Illinois employed judges with nearly ten years of experience, on
average, and received Chapter 11 filings from predominantly small businesses. During

14 National Bankruptcy Review Commission, Bankruptcy: The Next Twenty Years 631

(1997) (defining “small business” as one with $5 million or less in debt), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/15smalbu.pdf.
15 As of July 1999, these jurisdictions covered the largest Metropolitan Statistical Areas

in the United States. See eire.census.gov/popest/archives/ metro/ma99‐04.txt.
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the 1990s, filings by large, publicly‐traded corporations were generally filed in the
District of Delaware and Southern District of New York.16
The Northern District gave me access to a database (PACER)17 containing images
of every filing and judicial order in cases commencing after January 1, 1998. I
supplemented this database with another (ILREC), available on Lexis‐Nexis, which
identifies the founders, founding dates, and (where applicable) termination dates of
most firms in the PACER database.
This study focuses on outcomes in cases filed during 1998, the first year of
available data. For each case, I used PACER to obtain information about the firm’s
finances (assets, debt, cash flow, etc.), history (including events that led to the
bankruptcy petition), and experience in bankruptcy (time in bankruptcy, types of
motions filed by the debtor and its creditors, types of court orders, etc.). The ILREC
database was used to obtain information about the dates of firm founding and
termination. When ILREC was incomplete, I obtained this information by contacting the
firm’s managers, newspaper reporters, and other sources.

16 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Ayotte and David A. Skeel, Jr., Why Do Distressed Companies

Choose Delaware? Venue Choice and Court Experience in Bankruptcy, Working Paper (Columbia
Business School Sep. 5, 2002); Robert K. Rasmussen and Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters:
Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1357 (2000). Matters
changed substantially last year, however. Three of the largest corporate bankruptcies of all time
(Conseco, Inc., UAL Corp., and Kmart Corp.) were filed in the Northern District of Illinois dur‐
ing 2002. See www.ilnb.uscourts.gov/chapter11/ megacase.htm; www.bankruptcydata.
com/Research/ 15_Largest.htm.
17 The database, Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER), is available for a

fee at pacer.uscourts.gov. The Northern District waived the fee in my case.
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2.1

Sample Selection
According to Northern District records,18 184 Chapter 11 petitions were filed

during 1998 by corporations and individual debtors. Not all filings are relevant to the
analysis here. This paper is concerned with the effect of Chapter 11 on the reallocation
of assets, especially the decision whether to reorganize or liquidate a distressed firm.
Chapter 11 filings by corporations outside the real estate sector present the simplest
context in which to study this decision. Individuals may file Chapter 11 petitions, but
their filings involve two separate issues—a fresh start for the individual and,
sometimes, the continuation of a business. Only a fraction of all individual filings
involve businesses. Some are submitted by individuals who want to avoid liquidation
of assets (something inevitable under Chapter 7), but fail the eligibility requirements of
Chapter 13 (which allows debtors with sufficiently small debts to keep assets19). Even
among Chapter 11 filings in which an individual seeks to preserve a sole
proprietorship, it is difficult to study the effect of the Code on reallocation of assets. An
individual’s right to a fresh start may prevent liquidation of assets that would be sold‐
off in a wealth‐maximizing process.20

18 This figure is based on a report prepared at my request by the staff of the Northern

District. The original report included 185 filings, but one was actually a 1997 filing, which was
dropped. For this report, I am especially grateful to Steve Horvath, Jean Dalicandro, and David
Dusenberry.
19 11 U.S.C. §109(e).
20 To be sure, many corporations are privately‐held and the owner‐manager has person‐

ally guaranteed the firm’s debt. The outcome of the corporate Chapter 11 case therefore affects
the owner’s personal wealth. The effect, however, is indirect. Because there is no “fresh start”
policy at issue here, it is meaningful to think about “shutting down” a firm by liquidating its
assets.
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Corporations operating in the real estate sector are excluded because, like
individuals, their Chapter 11 filings are subject to special legal provisions.21
Additionally, asset reallocation decisions are often not at issue in cases involving real
estate firms. The owner of a piece of real estate (often an office building) will use
Chapter 11 to renegotiate debt owed to a single creditor, a mortgagee. Whether the
negotiations are successful or not, the use of the real estate will not change (land
dedicated to an office building will typically land dedicated to an office building).
As Table 1 shows, 42 filings by individuals and 22 filings by real estate ventures
were excluded from the sample. Additionally, the sample omits eight filings by firms
that entered Chapter 11 with the sole purpose of shutting down, selling off assets, or
resolving a dispute with a particular creditor. In each case, the fate of the firm was
largely determined before it entered bankruptcy. In one case, for example, a steakhouse
entered bankruptcy after sexual and racial discrimination lawsuits were filed by two
former employees. When the firm proposed a plan of reorganization in which the
employees would receive only a small fraction of their claims, they agreed to settle. The
settlement in turn prompted the firm to move to dismiss the case.
The sample also excludes from the sample filings by five firms that had shut
down before filing their Chapter 11 petitions, two firms about which insufficient
information was available, and one involuntary petition that was filed days before the
debtor filed its voluntary petition (the petitions were consolidated by the bankruptcy
court). The sample also consolidates filings by sister companies (the Court did so as
well), which reduced the number of filings by 7.22 After making these exclusions, the

21 See, e.g., Kenneth Klee, One Size Fits Some: Single Asset Real Estate Bankruptcy Cases, 87

Cornell L. Rev. 1285, 1296‐1302 (2002).
22 For example, the three outlets of a family‐run fur retailer (Andriana Furs) filed sepa‐

rate Chapter 11 petitions. The Court consolidated these petitions; so will this study.
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sample consists almost entirely of small, privately‐held businesses (descriptive statistics
are provided below). To preserve the homogeneity of the sample, filings by two, large
publicly‐traded firms were excluded as well. The final sample, then, consists of 95
filings by 91 firms (three firms filed multiple petitions during 1998; although each
petition was counted separately,23 the analysis below would not change in a meaningful
way if the repeat filings were dropped).
2.2

Summary Statistics
The sample firms are generally quite small, as Table 2 shows. Whereas the Small

Business Administration defines a “small business” as a firm with fewer than 500
employees,24 81 percent of the firms in this study had fewer than 20 employees and 96
percent had fewer than 100 employees. In terms of capital structure, the firms were
similarly small. Nearly 50 percent of the firms had less than $100,000 in assets; 75
percent had less than $1 million. Perhaps unsurprisingly for these types of firms, most
were young (63 percent were less than ten years old) and owned and managed by a
family or small group of investors (86 percent of firms fell within this category). The
firms represented a broad cross‐section of industries.
Although quite small, the firms in this sample are not markedly different from
small firms generally. Table 2 compares the sample firms to firms surveyed in the
Federal Reserve Board’s 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), a nationally
representative sample of businesses with 500 or fewer employees.25 Both in the SSBF

23 Although counted separately, these petitions were treated as potentially correlated

cases in the statistical analysis below. More formally, the analysis computes robust standard
errors, allowing for correlation across petitions filed by the same firm.
24 See The State of Small Business: A Report of the President, 1999‐2000, 18 n. 1.
25 For an introduction to the SSBF, see Marianne P. Bitler, Alicia M. Robb, and John D.

Wolken, Financial Services Used by Small Businesses: Evidence from the 1998 Survey of Small Business
Finances, 87 Fed. Res. Bull. 183 (April 2001).
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sample and in the sample used here, over 80 percent of firms have fewer than 20
employees. The industrial composition of both samples is also roughly comparable, the
only noticeable differences being a smaller number of eating and drinking places and a
larger number of wholesale trade establishments in the SSBF. These differences
undoubtedly reflect the relatively high failure rates in some industries, such as
restaurants. They may also reflect the small size of the sample studied here (95 filings
by 91 firms); a larger sample might produce a larger proportion of wholesalers. Other
important differences include age (the median SSBF firms is twice as old), asset size
(sample firms are half as large) and leverage (five times as large in sample firms). These
differences reflect, in part, the distressed condition of the sample firms. Most small
firms fail within the first four to six years of existence,26 and their assets (especially
cash) diminish and debt burdens mount as they descend into bankruptcy.
The characteristics of the sample firms are typical of small business bankruptcies
throughout the country. Table 3 compares the sample employed here (“N.D. IL”) to
firms in two recent surveys—Warren and Westbrook’s 1999 study of bankruptcy filings
in the most and least active court in every judicial circuit,27 and the Administrative
Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) survey of all Chapter 11 cases closed during 1998.28 Debt,
asset, and employment levels are similar across all surveys. For example, 68.4 percent of
firms in N.D. IL had less than $1 million in debt; the percentages for Warren &

26 Amy E. Knaup, Survival and Longevity in the Business Employment Dynamics Data,

Monthly Lab. Rev., May 2005, at 50, 51, 52 chart 1, available at
http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2005/05/ressum.pdf; Timothy Bates and Alfred Nucci, An Analy‐
sis of Small Business Size and the Rate of Discontinuance, 27 J. Small. Bus. Mgt. 1 (1989).
27 Elizabeth Warren and Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Financial Characteristics of Businesses

in Bankruptcy, 73 Am. Bankr. L. J. 499, 542 (1999).
28 Inter‐University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR), Study Nos.

4086, 4088.
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Westbrook and AO are 65.7 percent and 73.4 percent, respectively. Industry
demographics are somewhat comparable across the surveys as well. Instead of the SIC
classification system, Table 3 uses the industry classifications listed on the “face sheet”
of the bankruptcy petition.29 After sample selection (described in Table 1), Table 3
shows that the sample employed here is roughly comparable—with a few important
exceptions30—to those in previous empirical studies.
2.3

Outcomes of Chapter 11 Cases
Thirty‐six corporations—38 percent of the sample—emerged from bankruptcy

intact (“continuations”), either through a debt restructuring or a going‐concern sale. As
Panel A of Table 4 illustrates, 27 firms achieved a capital restructuring, either through a
formal plan reorganization or an informal renegotiation with key creditors. In the latter
case, the Chapter 11 petition was dismissed after the parties reached a compromise.
Another nine firms were sold‐off as going concerns. Some sales were accomplished in
the context of a plan of reorganization. Others were consummated under § 363 of the
Bankruptcy Code, which allows sales of all or substantially all of a firm’s assets, and the
debtor sought dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7 when the sale was complete.
In the remaining 59 cases—62 percent of the sample—the firm was shut down or
forced to exit Chapter 11 without a new capital structure, which in most cases resulted
in the corporation’s liquidation. As Table 4 shows, in 29 cases the debtor corporation
was shut down and its assets were distributed to creditors, either in a Chapter 7

29 This classification is seriously flawed, both because it is quite crude and because

debtors are frequently unsure about the appropriate classification for their firms. Nevertheless,
the vast majority of studies use it. See, e.g., Warren & Westbrook, supra, at 529‐30. It is thus the
only benchmark available.
30 As Table 3 shows, the N.D. IL survey contains fewer transportation and real estate

firms and more professional and unclassified firms than both the Warren & Westbrook and AO
surveys.
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proceeding (19 cases) or in state‐law proceedings after the case was dismissed (10
cases).
In the remaining 30 cases, the bankruptcy judge dismissed the corporation’s
bankruptcy petition and thereby exposed it to potential liquidation under state law. The
judge dismissed these cases for a variety of reasons, including the debtor firm’s failure
to file financial schedules, pay fees, hire an attorney, or show that it had a reasonable
chance of reorganizing successfully. In each case, the firm exited without a new capital
structure and was vulnerable to suit by creditors in state courts. The probability of
shutdown was very high after dismissal. Table 5 computes the number of years each
firm survived after exiting bankruptcy. These statistics are based on annual reports filed
with the Illinois Secretary of State. Annual reports are mandatory under state law;31
filing dates are documented in the LEXIS ILREC database. For each of the 30
corporations that exited bankruptcy without a new capital structure, Table 5 assumes
that the firm was active during the 6 months prior to and following the date of its
annual reports. Under this metric, 18 firms shut down immediately or within six
months of exiting Chapter 11; another five shut down within one year of exiting. These
numbers suggest that, if a debtor is forced to exit Chapter 11 without a new capital
structure, the probability of shutdown within the following six months is nearly 60%;
the probability of shutdown within the following year is nearly 75%.
Thus, for the majority of firms, dismissal of a Chapter 11 petition is accompanied
by a high probability of liquidation, much like a conversion to Chapter 7. A judge will
often dismiss a case, instead of converting it to Chapter 7, if the debtor has no assets

31 See 805 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/14.05, 5/14.10.
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unencumbered by liens; with no assets available to unsecured creditors, there is no
benefit to a Chapter 7 proceeding, which generates administrative costs.32
The legal outcomes observed here—reorganization, dismissal, and conversion to
Chapter 7—can be compared to the outcomes observed in the AO surveys of cases
closed during fiscal years 1998 and 1999. Panel B of Table 4 offers this comparison and
shows that the likelihood of reorganization in the Northern District does not differ
substantially from the national average for small businesses: about 30 percent of all
small business cases result in reorganization; the percentage in the Northern District is
28.4 percent.33
2.4

Duration of Chapter 11 Cases
It takes time for the Chapter 11 process to identify firms that should be continued

and those that should be shut down. Among firms that are ultimately continued,
Chapter 11 generates direct administrative costs, i.e., the legal costs of administering the
process. Among firms that are ultimately shut down, Chapter 11 generates not only
direct administrative costs but also the indirect resource allocation costs. While a case is
pending, the firm’s assets could have generated greater value elsewhere. Both direct
and indirect costs increase with the duration of a bankruptcy case.34
Case duration is remarkably short in the Northern District, as Figure 1 and Panel
A of Table 6 illustrate. Among the 36 firms that were continued, nearly two‐thirds (23

32 Interview with Chief Judge Eugene R. Wedoff, United States Bankruptcy Court for the

Northern District of Illinois (Dec. 3, 2002).
33 Relative rates of dismissal or conversion do differ significantly, however, with the

Northern District dismissing more cases and converting fewer.
34 Direct costs could be assessed more directly, by gathering data on fees incurred by

professionals. I look only at case duration in this paper because fee data is generally unavailable
or highly incomplete in cases that result in dismissal (42% of the sample) or conversion to Chap‐
ter 7 (20%).
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firms) exited in less than one year. More surprisingly, the Chapter 11 process identified
over 70 percent of non‐viable firms (42 of 59 cases) within six months; 44 percent (26
cases) were identified within three months. Only 8.5 percent of cases involving non‐
viable firms (5 cases) are still ongoing after one year. Relative to any reasonable
benchmark, a process that determines the fate of a business within five months is quick.
Various business brokerages, for example, report that between four and nine months is
typically needed to sell a business.35 Auctions in other contexts, such as FCC spectrum
auctions, typically require a similar amount of time.36
The Northern District’s speed may be atypical among bankruptcy courts
generally. Panel B of Table 6 compares duration to case closure in the Northern District
to the average duration across all jurisdictions. The key events in a Chapter 11 case—
confirmation, dismissal, and conversion to Chapter 7—typically occur months or even
years before the case is finally closed. The delay is caused by efforts to determine the
claims and relative priority of creditors (especially in cases resulting in confirmation),
sell assets, and recover preferential transfers. These efforts may be an important part of
determining how the value of the firm is divided among claimants, but they have no
bearing on the key economic decision about how the firm’s assets are deployed. That
decision is made, at least formally, when the court confirms, dismisses, or converts the
case.
Nonetheless, no comprehensive studies have looked closely at the duration to
these events. They have instead looked at the duration to case closure. Using data on

35 See, e.g., the websites of The Quincy Parker Group, quincyparkergroup.com (general

broker, reporting 6 to 9 months); Brookmoor Adams Advisors, brookmooradams.com (general
broker, also reporting 6 to 9 months); Control Marketing Corp, controlmarketing.com (specializ‐
ing in sale of copying and printing businesses; reporting 4 to 6 months).
36 Roger C. Cramton, The FCC Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment, 6 J. Econ. & Mgt.

Strategy 431 (1997).
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duration to case closure from the 1998 and 1999 AO surveys,37 Panel B of Table 6 shows
that, among cases resulting in confirmation, the median duration in the Northern
District was significantly (at the 1 percent level) faster than the median duration
nationally. The opposite, however, is true for cases resulting in dismissal. In contrast to
both of these figures, the median duration to conversion does not differ significantly
between the Northern District and the rest of the nation. Taken together with the
statistics on outcomes in Panel B of Table 4, these observations suggest that, relative to
other jurisdictions, the Northern District reorganizes about as many firms but does so
more quickly, dismisses more firms but does so more slowly, and converts fewer cases
but does so in about the same amount of time. Overall, decisionmaking in the Northern
District is faster than in other jurisdictions. The analysis that follows should be viewed
with these differences in mind.38

37 It was not possible to compare case durations in the AO data to the durations ob‐

served in the sample gathered for this paper because of coding problems in the AO data.
38 Among the possible reasons for faster decisionmaking in the Northern District, the
most likely seems to be its motion practice, which is different from other courts. The Northern
District permits the parties to a case to schedule motions (e.g., a debtor’s motion to use cash
collateral, a creditor’s motion to lift the automatic stay). Additionally, motions are presented
orally to the judge, who typically renders a decision by the end of the hearing. Interview with
Chief Bankruptcy Judge Eugene R. Wedoff, supra. See also Judge John Q. Squires’ description of
the practice at www.dcba.org/ brief/judpractice/0698.htm. Because only two days notice is
required for most motions, a party can file a motion and receive a decision in days. U.S.
Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Local Rules 9013‐1–9013‐9 (adopted June
1, 2003) (notice period is enlarged to 20 days for motions proposing the sale of assets outside the
ordinary course, conversion to Chapter 7 or dismissal, and other significant events; see Fed. R.
Bankr. P. 2002 (2003)). Opposing counsel need not draft a response; he or she may present
argument orally to the judge. As a result, the judge’s decision will be based not only on the
paper record, but also on open‐ended discussion with the parties. Judges can respond quickly to
news that a firm is failing. By contrast, in other jurisdictions motions are filed with the court
clerk, opportunity is given for opposing counsel to draft a response, and the judge often renders
a decision without conducting a hearing. Weeks or months may pass before a motion is
considered.
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3

Continuation Bias in Chapter 11 Cases
Conventional accounts of Chapter 11 hypothesize that continuation bias arises

from the control incumbent managers exercise over the bankruptcy process.39
Managerial control pushes the process in the direction of saving non‐viable firms. The
bias could, of course, arise from creditor control and run in the opposite direction.
Seeking immediate payment, creditors could push the process toward liquidation of
viable businesses.
Data from the Northern District offer several methods for testing these
hypotheses. One is based on procedural history: if managers exercise significant control
over the Chapter 11 process, creditors should have little success in terminating a case—
through dismissal, conversion to Chapter 7, or lifting the automatic stay—without
incumbent managers’ consent. Alternatively, creditor control should manifest itself in
frequent, successful motions to terminate a case. An alternative test is based on the post‐
bankruptcy history of reorganized firms: if a substantial number fail and subsequently
reenter bankruptcy, managers may have sufficient control over the process to prevent
liquidation of non‐viable firms.40 Still another test is based on the distinguishing financial
characteristics of firms that are shut down in bankruptcy versus those that leave intact: if
these firms are indistinguishable, the bankruptcy process may be catering to creditors
(who force shutdown of viable firms) or debtors (who force continuation of non‐viable

39 See, e.g., LoPucki, supra.
40 Hotchkiss, supra. See also Lynn M. LoPucki and Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public

Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54
Vand. L. Rev. 231 (2001). An even better measure is one that tracks the assets of troubled firms
(including firms that do not resort to Chapter 11) and evaluates their productivity before and
after the distress is resolved(either in or outside of a bankruptcy proceeding). See Maksimovic
& Phillips, supra. Data limitations make it impossible to implement this test here.
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firms). As applied to the Northern District data, none of these tests points to the
presence of significant continuation bias.
Continuation bias might be inferred from one party’s dominance of the process.
LoPucki, for example, found in his 1981 study of Chapter 11 cases filed in St. Louis that
the debtor was “in full control” because bankruptcy judges were passive and prevented
creditors from exercising any meaningful influence over the process.41 There is no
evidence of similar control—either by debtors or creditors—in the Northern District
data. As Table 7 illustrates, a party other than the debtor was responsible for nearly 68
percent of all shutdowns (40 of 59 cases). Here, a “shutdown motion” is defined is
defined narrowly as a motion to dismiss or convert a case to Chapter 7. Under this
definition, about 32 percent of all shutdowns (19 cases) are voluntary decisions by the
debtor, who moved to dismiss or convert its own Chapter 11 filing. But this number is
an over‐estimate, because it ignores 15.3 percent of shutdowns (9 cases) in which a
debtor moved to dismiss or convert because the court had already granted creditor
motions to lift the automatic stay and seize core assets of the business. For these
debtors, there was no meaningful choice other than to file a motion to convert or
dismiss their petitions. These motions, then, arguably reflect creditor control over the
bankruptcy process. If we add them to the motions actually filed by creditors and
trustees, we find that a party other than the debtor was actually or effectively
responsible for 83 percent of all shutdowns (49 cases). Debtors, then, did not dominate
the process.
Nor did creditors or the U.S. Trustee dominate the bankruptcy process. Courts
frequently denied creditors’ motions to lift the automatic stay, dismiss or convert a case
to Chapter 7, or achieve other relief that would lead to shutdown. While creditors filed

41 LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control, supra.
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these motions in nearly 68 percent of all shutdowns (40 cases; see Panel B of Table 7),
judges granted them in only 42 percent of the cases (25 cases; see Panel A). More
strikingly, creditors filed at least one shutdown motion in about 58 percent of
continuations (21 cases), i.e., cases in which the firm exited intact. All of these motions,
obviously, were denied. The U.S. Trustee filed similar, unsuccessful motions in about 22
percent of continuations (8 cases). These statistics suggest strongly that no party with a
predictable bias—debtors or creditors—completely dominates the bankruptcy process;
to the contrary, bankruptcy judges appear to play an important role in determining
when a firm should be shut down.
A bias might be present if the Chapter 11 process either preserved firms that
failed soon after exiting bankruptcy or shut down firms that were clearly worth saving.
Table 8 addresses the first possibility and presents data on the post‐bankruptcy
experience of the 27 firms that exited Chapter 11 as independent entities with new
capital structures (going‐concern sales are excluded). The first two columns are based
exclusively on the dates of the firms’ annual reports, as documented in the ILREC
database. Again, I assume that a firm was in operation during the six months preceding
and following the date of each annual report. The final two columns recomputed the
firm’s post‐bankruptcy experience after correcting for potential errors in ILREC.42
Between 3 and 6 firms failed within one year of exiting (11 to 22 percent of the 27 firms);
8 and 10 firm failed within two years (30 to 37 percent). These figures may seem large,
but they are fairly typical of small businesses. The annual hazard of discontinuing a

42 In three cases, annual reports indicated that the debtor had shut down soon after exit‐

ing bankruptcy, but other evidence suggested otherwise. In one case, the firm filed a Chapter 7
petition 17 months after exiting bankruptcy the first time. In two cases, I called the firms and
verified that they were in operation more than 2 years after exiting.
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business is around 20 percent even for firms over 10 years old.43 Thus, nothing in the
(admittedly small) sample here offers compelling evidence that the Chapter 11 process
erroneously preserved any of these firms.
Table 9 addresses the second possibility, that the Chapter 11 process liquidates
firms that should be preserved.44 A firm should be preserved if it suffers financial, not
economic, distress. Because financial and economic distress are hard to distinguish
empirically, Panel A reports the frequency with which obvious markers of economic
distress were observed in the sample firms. A firm in economic distress cannot rescue
its business in Chapter 11; the legal process is, at most, an effort to delay liquidation,
either to extract concessions from creditors or to gamble on the firm’s resurrection.45
Thus, a firm in economic distress will ignore procedural requirements, suspend
payment for ongoing expenses, and try to divert value to insiders. I call these “obvious”
markers of economic distress. Panel A reports the frequency with which firms were
sanctioned (through dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7) for such behavior. Among
firms that were shut down, nearly 80 percent (44 cases) exhibited obvious markers of
economic distress. It appears, then, that the Chapter 11 process is generally liquidating
firms that merit liquidation.
A similar story is told by Panel B, which reports the frequency with which
common markers of financial distress were observed in the sample firms. A firm

43 Thomas J. Holmes and James A. Schmitz, On the Turnover of Business Firms and Busi‐

ness Managers, 103 J. Pol. Econ. 1005 (1995).
44 Here, the sample is limited to the 91 unique firms in the sample; of these, 56 were shut

down.
45 See Douglas G. Baird and Edward R. Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business

Bankruptcies, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2310, 2349‐65 (2005). There the authors present additional detail
on the methodology for coding the cases.
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suffering financial, not economic, distress would be profitable but for its debt burden,
which it shoulders as a result of unexpected shocks (e.g., cash shortages arising from
the bankruptcy of a major customer) or past mistakes (e.g., overexpansion and cost
overruns, malfeasance of former managers, torts). Among firms that exited bankruptcy
intact, 71 percent (25 cases) reported these indicators of financial distress in disclosure
statements, motions to use cash collateral, or other documents submitted to the court.
Forty percent were recovering from overexpansion (14 cases); about 9 percent suffered
temporary cash shortages from the loss of customers, who had gone bankrupt or
breached significant contracts (3 cases); another 9 percent suffered cash shortages
because they had underestimated the costs of reconfiguring assets (e.g., converting a
restaurant to a lounge). These indicators of financial distress were also reported by 27
percent of firms that were shut down (15 cases).46 But most of these firms exhibited
both financial and economic distress. Only 11 percent of shutdowns (6 cases) exhibited
markers of financial distress but no obvious markers of economic distress. Together,
these figures suggest that the Chapter 11 process in the Northern District did not
systematically preserve non‐viable firms or liquidate viable ones.

46 This probably understates the frequency with which shutdowns exhibited markers of

financial distress. Case files are much less extensive for firms that are shutdown than for firms
that exit intact. The document with the most detailed information about the firm—the disclo‐
sure statement—is filed only when the debtor has assembled a plan of reorganization, but a
plan of reorganization is rarely assembled in cases that result in shutdown. In these cases,
markers of financial distress must instead be inferred from motions filed by the debtor (e.g., mo‐
tions to use cash collateral). If such motions were not filed, or if they do not contain adequate
information about the firm’s financial history, it is impossible to determine whether the firm
exhibited markers of financial distress. For these reasons, Panel B of Table 9 may understate the
percentage of shutdowns that exhibited markers of financial distress. It is unclear, however,
whether the understatement is significant. It could be argued, for example, that a firm in finan‐
cial (not economic) distress generally will announce this fact to the court and its creditors, in an
effort to prevent shutdown. Thus, if none of a debtor’s motions point to markers of financial dis‐
tress, it is plausible that the firm suffered economic (not financial) distress.
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4

A formal test of continuation bias
A basic task of the Chapter 11 process is to distinguish—or “filter”47—viable

firms worth reorganizing from non‐viable firms that should be shut down. As Table 4
illustrates, only 36 of the 95 Chapter 11 petitions filed in the Northern District—less
than 40 percent—concluded with the debtor firm exiting intact. The bankruptcy process
therefore filters the bulk of filings into liquidation. Filtering is typically accomplished
by granting the motion of a creditor or the U.S. Trustee to lift the automatic stay and
allow seizure of core assets, to dismiss the case and allow creditors to resort to their
state‐law remedies, or to convert the case to Chapter 7 and commence liquidation. As
Table 7 illustrates, these motions are made repeatedly during a Chapter 11 case before a
judge finally grants one. In this section, I develop a model of optimal filtering (in section
4.1) and use its implications as a benchmark for evaluating outcomes in the Northern
District (in sections 4.2 and 4.3).
4.1

A simple model of the shutdown decision
The process of filtering is analogous to a matching problem: the goal of the

bankruptcy system is to identify “good” and “bad” matches between firms and the
opportunity to reorganize offered by Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Good (bad)
matches involve firms with (without) significant going‐concern surplus. Information
about firm quality is uncertain when a bankruptcy petition is filed; better information is
retrieved over the course of the case. As judges, creditors, the U.S. Trustee, and the
debtor update their beliefs regarding the expected quality of a firm, they must decide
whether reorganization efforts should continue or be terminated. If termination is most
attractive, creditors and the U.S. Trustee will file motions to dismiss the case, to convert
it to Chapter 7, or to lift the automatic stay to permit seizure of core assets. A debtor too

47 See Michelle J. White, Corporate Bankruptcy as a Filtering Device: Chapter 11 Reorganiza‐

tions and Out‐of‐Court Debt Restructurings, 10 J. Law, Econ. & Org. 268 (1994).
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may realize that its prospects are poor (perhaps because creditors will not offer
additional financing or have denied access to cash collateral) and seek dismissal or
conversion. A judge will generally grant a debtor’s motion (under the Code, a debtor
can initiate or terminate a case at will, with some exceptions); a creditor’s motion will be
granted only after the judge independently assesses firm quality.
This process can be studied formally using a simple “matching model,”48 drawn
from the optimal stopping and job search literatures49 and set out in an appendix. This
model allows us to identify characteristics of an ideal bankruptcy process that optimally
filters good from bad “matches” as information about firm quality is updated over time.
For analytic convenience, the model assumes that a wealth‐maximizing planner (called,
for convenience, “the judge”) runs the process. In reality, of course, the outcomes of the
bankruptcy process are determined by negotiation and bargaining among debtors,
creditors, trustees, and judges. The model merely provides a theoretical benchmark
against which we can evaluate actually bankruptcy outcomes and test for the presence
of continuation bias.

48 The process could also be analyzed using a “real options” model. The implications are

roughly the same. See Baird and Morrison, Optimal Timing and Legal Decision‐Making, supra.
Chen and Sundaresan develop a more general model of the shutdown decision and extend it to
consider debtor‐in‐possession financing. See Nan Chen and Suresh Sundaresan, The Optimal
Bankruptcy Resolution and the Role of Debtor in Possession Financing, Working Paper (Columbia
Business School 2003).
49 This literature studies the optimal time to terminate an ongoing process, and has been

used to analyze a firm’s decision to abandon a troubled project, a worker’s decision to discon‐
tinue job search, and a counterparty’s decision to repudiate an ongoing contract. See, e.g., Avi‐
nash K. Dixit and Robert S. Pindyck, Investment Under Uncertainty ch. 1‐2, 7 (Princeton 1994);
Thomas J. Sargent, Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory (Harvard 1987); Boyan Jovanovic, Job Match‐
ing and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 972 (1979); Alexander J. Triantis and George G.
Triantis, Timing Problems in Contract Breach Decisions, 41 J. Law & Econ. 163 (1998).
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Two important implications emerge from this model. First, if a firm’s estimated
going‐concern value at filing (G) is not significantly above or below its liquidation
value, the outcome of its Chapter 11 case should be correlated with the degree of
uncertainty (U) surrounding that estimate. The greater the uncertainty surrounding
estimated firm value, the longer the bankruptcy process should wait before exercising
the shutdown option. This is an “options effect” and reflects the asymmetric effect of
uncertainty in this context. The greater the uncertainty, the greater the probability that
the firm will prove to be a good match tomorrow. There is, of course, a higher
probability that the firm will prove to be an unprofitable bad match, but the firm’s
assets (L) can be sold if this happens. The firm’s liquidation value offers a hedge against
the downside risk from waiting to liquidate the firm.50 As a result, the greater the
uncertainty surrounding firm value, the longer a firm should spend in Chapter 11.
This options effect, however, will be absent in cases in which the firm’s going
concern value G is significantly above or below its liquidation value L. If it is
significantly above liquidation value, it is virtually certain that the firm will be
reorganized or restructured in bankruptcy. The probability of shutdown will be zero or
close to it. Conversely, if a firm’s going‐concern value is significantly below the
liquidation value of its assets, it will be shut down immediately.
The second implication of the model is that the probability (or hazard rate) of
exercising the shutdown option should be hump shaped over time—low initially, then

50 This implication can be reversed under certain conditions, see Luigi Guiso and

Giuseppe Parigi, Investment and Demand Uncertainty, 114 Q. J. Econ. 185 (1999), but has been
confirmed in several recent studies. See Alberto Moel and Peter Tufano, When are Real Options
Exercised? An Empirical Study of Mine Closings, 15 Rev. Fin. Stud. 35 (2002); Vivek Ghosal and
Prakash Loungani, The Differential Impact of Uncertainty on Investment in Small and Large Busi‐
nesses, 82 Rev. Econ. Stat. 338 (2000); Guiso and Parigi, supra.
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rising, and ultimately declining.51 The probability should be low when a firm first
enters the bankruptcy process because uncertainty is high. As information is obtained
and uncertainty resolved, the parties (debtor, creditors, judge) should have stronger
incentives to exercise the option. The probability of shutdown will therefore rise as
ventures with no viability are discovered and abandoned. Once the shutdown option is
exercised in these cases, however, the only remaining ventures will be those with
relatively high profitability (put differently, the shutdown option is “out of the money”)
or those with highly uncertain profitability. Some of these firms will never be shut
down; others will be shut down only after a delay, during which the decision‐maker
gathers information about the firms’ viability. Thus, the probability of shutdown should
fall gradually over time. This is the “selection effect.” This effect has been empirically
verified in work applying matching models to labor markets.52
These two implications—the options effect and selection effect—provide simple
yet theoretically coherent benchmarks for evaluating existing practice in bankruptcy
courts.

51 Technically, the “hump shape” will characterize the probability (or hazard) of shut‐

down only if the value of the venture (“going‐concern value”) is at least as great as its liquida‐
tion value when the decision‐maker first consider whether to exercise the shutdown option. Al‐
ternatively, if we observe multiple decisions by the decision‐maker, a “hump shape” pattern
will emerge if most of the ventures begin with going‐concern value in excess of liquidation
value. In the context of Chapter 11, this means that a hump‐shaped pattern will be observed if
most firms file petitions only when their value as going concerns is at least as great as their liq‐
uidation values (i.e., few firms file petitions when they are destined to be shut down immedi‐
ately by the bankruptcy judge).
52 See Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. Pol. Econ. 972

(1979), for theory and Julia Lane and Michael Parkin, Turnover in an Accounting Firm, 16 J. Labor
Econ. 702 (1998), for an empirical test.
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4.2

Evidence of the selection effect
The “selection” effect is evident in Figure 1, which shows a hump‐shaped

probability of shutdown. The likelihood of shutdown (displayed in black bars) increases
during the first three months of a bankruptcy petition, reaches a maximum around 3
months, and then falls. Figure 2 plots the monthly hazard rate of shutdown, which is
computed as the ratio of the number of firms shut down to the number of firms not yet
shut down in each month.53 Using a normal approximation to the binomial,54 the
increase from month 1 to month 3 is significant at the 97.5 percent confidence level,
while the decrease from month 3 to month 9 is significant at the 96.1 percent confidence
level. The hump remains statistically significant.55
The hump‐shaped pattern suggests an absence of continuation bias. This
evidence must, of course, be seen in conjunction with the rest. By itself, the hump‐shape
pattern is not conclusive as other processes can produce it as well. For example, if
bankruptcy judges in the Northern District flipped coins to determine a firm’s fate and
if, for some reason, most judges flipped a coin when the case reached the three‐month
mark, but some flipped it earlier and some later, we would see a similar pattern. Here it
is not the humped‐shaped pattern, but rather the evidence that judges sort effectively
between viable and nonviable firms that allows us to reject such an account of
bankruptcy decisionmaking.

53 I code a firm as “not yet shut down” even if it has left the sample because it has been

reorganized. I am implicitly assuming that such a firm, which was “cured” of its financial dis‐
tress, would not have been shut down even if it remained in bankruptcy for an extended period.
54 The same test is employed by Kenneth S. Chapman and Lawrence Southwick, Jr.,

Testing the Matching Hypothesis: The Case of Major League Baseball, 81 Am. Econ. Rev. 1352, 1359
(1991).
55 Applying a normal approximation to the binomial distribution, the increase from

month 1 to month 3 is significant at the 98.4% confidence level, while the decrease from month 3
to month 9 is significant at the 92.5% level.
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4.3

Evidence of the options effect
Three variables drive the options effect: a firm’s estimated going‐concern value

(G), the uncertainty surrounding that estimate (U), and the liquidation value of the
firm’s assets (L). If the difference between G and L is not large, an increase in U should
increase the amount of time that a firm spends in Chapter 11. It could also increase the
probability that a firm exits bankruptcy intact, but only if the firm is reorganized or
sold‐off at a point when significant uncertainty about its viability remains. This might
occur, for example, if the parties to the bankruptcy process believe that it is cheaper to
monitor the firm’s viability outside of Chapter 11.
4.3.1. Proxies for Key Variables
Although L can be estimated using a debtor firm’s financial schedules (which
offer rough estimates of the market value of assets), we can develop only rough proxies
for G and U for the privately‐held firms in this study because the bankruptcy filings
provide only cursory information about pre‐petition financial performance. Proxies for
U can be derived from the observed volatility surrounding earnings of firms in the same
industry. One such proxy is the standard deviation of monthly returns on a portfolio of
publicly traded firms in the industry.56 This variable (“Volatility, stockmarket data”) is
a proxy of the uncertainty driving the “options effect” in the optimal stopping model,
assuming a weak correlation between the volatility surrounding the earnings of
publicly‐traded firms and those of privately‐held firms in the same industry.
Another proxy is the cross‐sectional variation in profitability among small
businesses located in metropolitan areas and operating in the same industry, which can

56 The proxy is computed using data from 1995‐1997, the three years prior to the bank‐

ruptcy filings in this study (a three‐year window appears to be a standard time‐frame for as‐
sessing volatility). The stock‐return data was taken from the 48 Industry Portfolios maintained
by Eugene Fama and Kenneth R. French. See mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/ faculty/
ken.french/data_library.html.
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be derived from 1998 SSBF data. Because it uses data on small businesses—the focus of
this paper—this measure (“Volatility, SSBF data”) has advantages relative to the former
measure, “Volatility, stock.” On the other hand, the former measure is theoretically
more attractive because it is based on variation in profitability within firms over time,
not profitability across firms at a single point in time (namely calendar year 1998).
A final proxy for U is the proportion of small businesses within a particular
industry that “die” each year (“Firm Attrition Rate”). The U.S. Census Bureau offers
dynamic data tracking the births and deaths of small businesses over time. Deaths are
defined as closures, which could result from liquidation or merger with another firm.
From this data we can derive an average probability (over the period 1995‐97) that a
firm within particular industry will “die” over the course of a year. This measure is a
useful proxy for U because it offers a rough measure of the relative risk of shutdown
across industries.
Proxies for going‐concern value (G) are more difficult to find. If we assume that a
firm’s going‐concern value is correlated with industry conditions, one proxy for a firm’s
G is the average growth rate of earnings, employment, or firms in the same industry. If
an industry is growing relatively fast, firms in that industry may have relatively high
going concern value. A more refined, firm‐based proxy is whether the firm entered
bankruptcy as a result of overexpansion; such a firm is likely suffering financial distress
and may have going concern surplus if it scales back its operations.
Another firm‐based proxy is whether the firm, upon entering bankruptcy, files a
motion to use cash collateral. Many firms have given lenders security interests in cash
and accounts receivable. To access these sources of liquidity, the firms must either
obtain permission from the lenders or the court. In practice, courts rarely grant
permission over the objection of lenders. Knowing this, debtor firms rarely file motions
to use cash collateral without first obtaining the lenders’ permission. The filing of a
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petition, therefore, offers some evidence that both the debtor and its primary creditors
believe that the firm has value as a going concern. The difficulty with both of these firm‐
based proxies is that not all firms with significant going‐concern surplus (high G) will
be suffering overexpansion problems or need to file motions to use cash collateral (they
may, for example, have not given security interests in their cash). Thus, these proxies
identify only some of the firms with relatively high G.
These variables—L, G, and U—are not the only plausible factors affecting the
likelihood of shut down in bankruptcy. Other variables include the firm’s liquidity (as
measured by cash holdings) at the beginning of the case; firms with greater cash
holdings are less dependant upon outside sources of liquidity and may be able to
survive longer in Chapter 11. Creditor control may also affect the amount of time a firm
spends in bankruptcy. I measure the degree of creditor control based on a firm’s
leverage (debt divided by assets), the extent to which its assets are encumbered by
security interests, and whether an owner of the firm has personally guaranteed the
firm’s debts. Other factors that may affect the shutdown decision are firm characteristics
(e.g., age, whether the firm has entered bankruptcy before) and whether the firm
complies with bankruptcy procedures (by, e.g., filing required schedules).
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4.3.2

Univariate Tests
An initial look at these variables is set out in Tables 9 and 10. Table 9 compares

firms that exited before and after the median case duration. About 50 percent of
shutdowns occurred within 4 months (“quick shutdowns”); 50 percent of all
terminations occurred within 9 months (“quick exits”). Table 10 compares firms that
exited intact against those that were shut down. Two of the proxies for U—Volatility,
stockmarket data and Volatility, SSBF data—are larger on average in cases where
shutdown or exit occurred later in time (“slow” shutdowns and exits). This is consistent
with the options effect, but the results are only marginal significant. Among shutdowns,
the other proxy for U—Firm Attrition Rate— is larger on average among slow
shutdowns, consistent with the options effect. But among cases where exit occurred for
any reason, it is larger on average among quick exits, suggesting that Firm Attrition
Rate was relatively high among firms that were reorganized or sold off quickly.
The proxies for G are similarly mixed. Firm Growth Rate—the average annual
increase in the number of firms, by industry, during 1995‐97—does not vary
significantly between quick and slow shutdowns or between quick and slow exits, but it
is significantly larger among shutdowns than among continuations (see Table 10). The
same pattern emerges when we analyze the average annual increase in employment, by
industry, for the same period. This may suggest that Firm Growth Rate is a poor proxy
for G, or it may reflect the possibility that industries with high growth rates also have
high earnings volatility (the correlation with Volatility, stockmarket is .35). The other
proxies for G—Overexpansion and Motion to Use Cash Collateral—exhibit patterns
more consistent with the matching model: they are larger on average in cases that
resulted in slow shutdown, slow exit, and continuation.
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The remaining summary statistics in Tables 9 and 10 exhibit other interesting
patterns. Firms that were shutdown quickly were relatively young, had smaller cash
holdings, and had larger secured debt levels, and were more likely to have violated
court rules (by not filing financial schedules or by proceeding without a lawyer) than
firms that were shutdown more slowly. Similar differences characterize quick versus
slow exits (Table 9) and shutdowns versus continuations (Table 10).
4.3.3

Multivariate tests
Simple summary statistics offer some evidence supporting the existence of an

options effect. Multivariate analysis, displayed in Table 11, allows us to test this effect
more carefully.
Columns I through VII of Table 11 analyze the duration of cases resulting in
shutdown. Columns I and II present a simple Cox model of the hazard rate, defined as
the probability of shutdown at time t conditional upon avoiding shutdown at least until
t. Formally, the hazard rate h(t , X ) is defined as h(t , X ) = h(0)e xβ , where X is a vector of
regressors and β a vector of estimated coefficients. A negative coefficient implies that a
regressor reduces the hazard of shutdown or, equivalently, increases the duration until
shutdown. The Cox model is attractive largely because it makes no assumption about
the shape of h(0), the “baseline” hazard rate. Column I presents the results of a simple
model in which the only covariates are proxies for U, G, and L. Consistent with the
univariate analysis in Table 9, the coefficients on the proxies for uncertainty are
uniformly negative, implying that an increase in uncertainty is correlated with longer
case duration. The negative coefficient is marginally significant for Industry Volatility,
Stock Data and for Industry Attrition Rate. The third proxy—Industry Volatility, SSBF
Data—appears to have no predictive value. Column II shows that little or nothing
changes in the model when this variable is dropped (it is dropped in the remaining
analysis as well). On net, then, shutdown occurs later in time for firms with relatively
30

high indexes of U. Columns I and II show also that various measures of going‐concern
surplus reduce the hazard rate, again consistent with the theoretical model.
Column III augments the Cox model by adding other variables that may affect
the hazard of shutdown. The proxies for uncertainty remain negative but increase in
significance. Among the newly added variables, cash holdings and leverage are
strongly correlated with reductions in the hazard rate; on the other hand, an increase in
the hazard rate is likely when a firm proceeds without a lawyer or has filed a
bankruptcy petition in the preceding six years. These observations are unchanged when
we eliminate repeat filings by the same firm during the sample period (Column III).
Columns V through VII of Table 11 show that the results of the Cox model are
similar to those obtained from duration models in which the baseline hazard rate h(0) is
assumed to have a particular distribution, such as the Weibull (Column V), Lognormal
(VI), and Exponential (VII) distributions. The models applying the Weibull and
Exponential distributions are models of the hazard rate, so a negative coefficient implies
that an increase in the regressor reduces the hazard rate and increases case length. In
contrast, the model applying the lognormal distribution is a model of case length itself,
so a positive coefficient implies a longer case length. Thus, the positive coefficients on
the proxies for uncertainty in Column VI are consistent with the negative coefficients in
the other columns.
It should be noted that the results in Columns I through VII are based entirely on
the subset of cases involving shutdowns (n=59). The models suggest that, among these
cases, the greater the uncertainty surrounding firm viability, the longer the firm is
allowed to continue operations in Chapter 11. These models, of course, ignore
information in the subset of cases in which the firm exited bankruptcy intact
(“continuations”). Column VIII accounts for this information using a specialized
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duration model known as a “cure” or “split population” model,57 which assumes that
all firms that entered the bankruptcy system—even those that ultimately exited intact—
were at risk of shutdown. Firms that exited intact—via a plan of reorganization or a
going‐concern sale—might have been shut down had they lingered in Chapter 11. The
“cure” model simultaneously estimates (1) the probability that a firm would have been
shut down in bankruptcy and, assuming it would have been shut down, (2) the amount
of time that would have elapsed before shutdown occurred.
Formally, the likelihood function for the cure model is assembled as follows.
Following Schmidt and Witte,58 let S be an unobservable variable indicating whether a
firm would be shut down in bankruptcy if the bankruptcy judge were given sufficient
time to gather information about the firm. Let S equal one if a firm would be shutdown
and zero otherwise. Assume that the probability that S equals 1 is δ: Pr (S = 1) = δ and
Pr (S = 0 ) = 1 − δ . Next, let t measure the amount of time a firm spends in bankruptcy

before being shut down. Assume that t is distributed according to some cumulative
distribution function G. Thus, the density of firms that are shut down after t months in
bankruptcy is g (t S = 1) . Finally, let C be a dummy variable indicating whether
information about a firm is “censored,” i.e., we know that the firm exited bankruptcy
but do not know whether it would have been shut down had it stayed. Let C equal zero
if a firm is shut down in bankruptcy and one if it exits. If a firm exits bankruptcy

57 See Joseph Berkson and Robert P. Gage, Survival Curve for Patients Following Treatment,

J. Am. Statistical Assoc. 501 (1952) for early analysis of this model. For econometric applications,
see Peter Schmidt and Ann Dryden Witte, Predicting Recidivism Using “Split Population” Survival
Time Models, 40 J. Econometrics 141; Arindam Bandopadhyaya and Sanjiv Jaggia, An Analysis of
Second Time Around Bankruptcies Using a Split‐Population Duration Model, 8 J. Empirical Fin. 201
(2001).
58 Supra, at 148‐49.
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without being shut down, let T measure the amount of time the firm spent in
bankruptcy.
With these definitions in hand, we can write the contribution to the likelihood
function by firms (indexed by i) that are shut down in bankruptcy as
Pr (S = 1)g (t i S = 1) = δg (t i S = 1) .

For firms that exit bankruptcy intact (indexed by j), the contribution to the likelihood
function is

(

)

[ (

)]

Pr (C = 1) = Pr (S = 0) + Pr (S = 1) Pr t > T j S = 1 = (1 − δ ) + δ 1 − G T j S = 1 .
Therefore, the likelihood function is
⎧
⎫
L = ∑i δg t i S = 1 + ∑ j ⎨(1 − δ ) + δ ⎡1 − G⎛⎜ T j S = 1⎞⎟⎤ ⎬
⎥
⎢
⎝
⎠
⎦⎭
⎣
⎩
where ∑i sums over firms shut down in bankruptcy (C=0) and

[ (

)]

∑j

sums over firms

that exited bankruptcy intact (C=1). Estimates reported in Column VIII assume that G is
a lognormal distribution, a standard assumption in settings where the hazard rate is
non‐monotonic, as it is here. The model also assumes, for simplicity, that δ is a scalar
with logistic distribution.59
Column VIII shows that the estimates derived from this cure model are roughly
identical to those generated by a simple duration model in which the baseline hazard is
assumed to be lognormal. Combined with the results in Columns I through VII, these
results offer suggestive evidence in favor of the options effect.
Instead of studying the duration to shutdown, Column IX analyzes the probability
of shutdown using a standard logit model. Here, the subset of cases resulting in
shutdown are compared to the subset resulting in continuation. The coefficients in
Column IX indicate the effect of changes in the control variables on the probability of
shutdown. The dependent (dummy) variable equals one if a case resulted in shutdown
59 This simple model is estimated using Mario Cleve’s “lncure” program for STATA,

available at http://www.stata.com/users/mcleves/lncure/.
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and zero otherwise. Interestingly, only one of the proxies for uncertainty—Industry
Volatility, Stock Data—has the predicted negative effect. The other proxy has a positive,
but insignificant, coefficient. As in the tabular analysis, the proxies for going‐concern
surplus also have mixed coefficients. An increase in Industry Growth Rate is strongly
correlated with an increase in the probability of shutdown. The opposite is true for the
other proxies, Overexpansion Problems and Cash Collateral Motion. The logit model,
then, offers only mixed support for the options effect. This may not be surprising,
because the theory offers its strongest implications for firms that are actually shut
down.
These results using the formal model are again generally consistent with what
we would observe if a rational market actor were charged with sorting between viable
and nonviable firms. The hazard of shutdown is hump‐shaped, a firm is more likely to
exit bankruptcy intact if it has significant going concern value, and a firms is more
likely to be shut down quickly if there is relatively little uncertainty about its value as a
going concern.
5.

Policy Implications and Conclusions
Evidence gathered from the Northern District of Illinois supports the hypothesis

that current practice in the bankruptcy courts exhibits no systematic bias in favor of
saving non‐viable firms. The debtor’s managers are not in control and firms destined to
fail are identified quickly. Viewed through the lens of a formal matching model of the
bankruptcy process, the data again suggest that bias commonly ascribed to the Chapter
11 process is either absent or empirically unimportant. Thus, the costs of small business
Chapter 11 cases are much smaller than commonly thought. Whether the benefits of
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Chapter 11 are even enough to justify these costs, however, is far from self‐evident. A
careful examination of the potential benefits of Chapter 11 is needed too.60

60 In another paper, I use data from the Northern District to address this question as

well. See Baird and Morrison, Serial Entrepreneurs and Small Business Bankruptcies, supra. There
we argue that the benefits of small business Chapter 11s, like the costs, are quite low, even
when the business survives as a going concern.
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Appendix
A Matching Model of Chapter 11
Consider an idealized bankruptcy court that receives Chapter 11 petitions by a
continuum of firms every period. Some are worth reorganizing; they appear with
probability p. The rest should be liquidated and appear with probability 1‐p. When a
particular firm files a petition, no one knows whether it is a high‐value firm (H) worth
reorganizing or a low‐value (L) firm that should be liquidated. Information about firm
type, however, is revealed over the course of the bankruptcy case. During the first
period of the case (period 1), the court will receive a signal s of firm type. The signal is
either good (g) or bad (b). Good signals occur with probability π g and bad with
probability π b . Additionally, good signals are more likely to arise from H firms than
from L firms: π
than H firms: π

gH

bL

>π
>π

gL

bH

. Similarly, bad signals are more likely to arise from L firms

. Note that π

gH

+π

bH

= 1 and that π

gL

+π

bL

= 1.

After receiving the first‐period signal, the judge can either shut the firm down or
allow it to continue. If the firm is shut down, the return to creditors is R. If it is allowed
to continue, the judge will receive an additional signal of firm quality in the second
period of the case (period 2). Again, the signal is either g or b with probabilities
⎧π
⎧
⎫
⎫
⎨ g H , π b H ⎬ and ⎨π g L , π b L ⎬ , respectively. And, again, at the end of period 2 the judge
⎩
⎩
⎭
⎭

36

can choose either to liquidate the firm or allow it to continue. If the judge allows the
firm to continue to the third period (period 3), full information about firm type will be
revealed at the end of the period. That is, the firm will be revealed to be either H or L at
the end of period 3. If the firm is revealed to be type H, the firm is worth H to creditors.
If it is revealed to be type L, it is worth only L<R. There is a cost to waiting, however.
The judge applies a discount factor β = 1 (1 + r ) to future payoffs (the judge discounts
the future at rate r because creditors do).
In this three‐period model, the judge has an opportunity to exercise the
shutdown option at the end of each period. When is the optimal time to exercise the
option? We can characterize the optimal decision by working backwards. At the end of
period 3, the decision is trivial. A firm will be liquidated if it is type L and kept intact if
it is type H; the payoff to liquidation (R) exceeds the going‐concern value of type‐L
firms but falls short of the value of type‐H firms. More formally, the judge’s problem is
max{H , R} = H if the firm is type H and max{L, R} = R if the firm is type L.

Given the judge’s decision rules at the end of period 3, we can characterize the
rules at the end of period 2. Here the judge’s decision will depend on a firm’s history of
signals, s. If the firm’s history was s = {g , g }, meaning that good signals were received in
periods 1 and 2, then the firm’s expected value as a going concern will be
E (V gg ) = Pr( H gg ) H + Pr( L gg ) R ,
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where
Pr( H gg ) =

π g Hπ g H p

π g H π g H p + π g L π g L (1 − p )

according to Bayes’ Rule. Note that E (V gg ) incorporates the period 3 decision rules—
type H firms will be kept intact (with payoff H) and type L firms will be liquidated
(with payoff R). The judge’s problem is
max{βE (V gg ), R}.

A firm will be kept intact only if the discounted expected value of the firm is at
least as great as the return to creditors from immediate liquidation: β E (V gg ) ≥ R .
Simplifying this expression, we can show that the firm is worth liquidating only if the
*
return to creditors is at least equal to R gg
, such that

2

*
=
R gg

Pr( H gg )

(1 + r ) − (1 − Pr( H gg ))

H=

⎞
⎛π
⎜ gH⎟ p
⎠
⎝
2

2

⎛π
⎞
⎛
⎞
⎜ g H ⎟ p (1 + r ) + ⎜ π g L ⎟ (1 − p )r
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠

H.

*
*
, Rbg
, and
Analogous expressions61 characterize the threshold return to creditors— R gb
*
Rbb
—when the judge has received different signals of firm quality in periods 1 and 2.

61These expressions are
*
Rbb
=

Pr( H bb)

(1 + r ) − (1 − Pr( H bb) )

*
*
= Rbg
=
R gb

Pr( H gb)

(1 + r ) − (1 − Pr( H gb) )

H.
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H and

These thresholds have important characteristics. First, the thresholds are higher for
*
*
*
*
firms with better histories: R gg
, which follows from
> R gb
= Rbg
> R gg

Pr (H gg ) > Pr (H bg ) = Pr (H gb ) > Pr (H bb ). 62

This simply means that judges are less willing to terminate firms that have generated
better signals of quality. More importantly, all of these thresholds are increasing in the
variance of firm quality, σ 2 = p (1 − p )(H − L )2 . Holding average quality—
pH + (1 − p )L —constant, variance in firm quality increases as the difference between H

and L increases. Consider an increase in H and decrease in L that raises variance but
*
and all other thresholds are increasing in H,
holds average quality constant. Since R gg

all thresholds will rise. This property reflects the “option value” of liquidation.
Although increases in variance reduce the value of type‐L firms, a judge can always
avoid the downside risk by liquidating the firm (for payoff R>L). Thanks to this

62To see this, note that the expression
2

2

⎛π
⎞
⎜ gH⎟ p
⎝
⎠
2

2

⎛π
⎞
⎛
⎞
⎜ g H ⎟ p(1 + r ) + ⎜ π g L ⎟ (1 − p )
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠
⎛π
⎜ bl
⎜π
⎜ bH
⎝

2

⎞
⎛π
⎟
⎜ gL
⎟ > ⎜π
⎟
⎜ gH
⎠
⎝

Pr (H gg ) > Pr (H bb ) is equivalent to

>

⎛π
⎞
⎜ bH ⎟ p
⎝
⎠
2

2

⎛π
⎞
⎛
⎞
⎜ b H ⎟ p + ⎜ π b g L ⎟ (1 − p )
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠

2

, which is equivalent to

⎞
⎟
⎟ . The last inequality is true because π g H > π g L and π b H < π b L . Similar
⎟
⎠
calculations show that Pr (H gg ) > Pr (H gb ) and Pr (H gb ) > Pr (H bb ) .
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“insurance,” an increase in variance can only increase the potential payoff to creditors
and the debtor.
Turn now to the judge’s problem at the end of period 1, given the decision rules
at the end of periods 2 and 3. The judge’s decision here will depend on the relationship
*
*
between the firm’s liquidation value (R) and the period‐2 thresholds, R gg
, R gb
, and
*
Rbb
. The analysis must therefore be divided into the different cases. Although four
*
*
*
*
and Rbb
) are interesting. If
cases are possible, only two ( R gb
< R < R gg
< R < R gb

*
R > R gg
, a judge will always liquidate the firm at the end of period of period 2; the

history of signals is irrelevant in light of the large payoff from liquidation. If a firm will
always be liquidated at the end of period 2, it makes no sense to avoid liquidation in
period 1. Hence, the firm will always be liquidated at the end of period 1. Conversely, if
*
R < Rbb
, a judge will always keep a firm intact at the end of period 2, regardless of the

history of signals, because the payoff to creditors is so low. It may still make sense to
liquidate the firm at the end of period 1 (e.g., the interest rate may be sufficiently high to
make liquidation profitable in period 1 but not in period 2),63 but this situation seems
fairly unusual.

{

63 To see this, note that if the first‐period signal was g, the judge solves

}

max β 2 E (V g ), R at the end of period 1. The firm will be kept intact if the return to creditor is
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*
*
Thus, consider Case 1: R gg
, which implies that a firm will be kept
> R > R gb

intact at the end of period 2 only if its history of signals was {g , g }. Knowing this, the
judge will shut down any firm with a bad first‐period signal. For these firms, the
threshold return to creditors is Rb*1 = 0 . For firms with good first‐period signals, on the
other hand, the judge’s problem is
max{β [Pr( g | g ) β E (V gg ) + Pr(b | g ) R ], R}

where Pr( g | g ) and Pr(b | g ) are the probabilities of good and bad signals in period 2,
given a good signal in period 1. For these firms, continuation is superior unless the
return to creditors (R) exceeds the threshold R g*1 defined by
R g*1 =

Pr( H gg )

(1 + r )(1 + Pr (g )r ) − (1 − Pr( H gg ) )

H.

below the following threshold:

R g* =

Pr (H g )

(1 + r )2 − (1 − Pr( H g ) )

H.

{

( )

}

Alternatively, if the first‐period signal was b, the judge solves max β 2 E V b , R and the
threshold is

Rb* =

Pr (H b )

(1 + r )2 − (1 − Pr( H b) )

H.

In either case, then, there exists a positive threshold above which liquidation is preferable, even
though liquidation will never be preferable in the future.
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*
*
For R g*1 to lie between R gb
and R gg
, the interest rate r must be sufficiently low64 (if the

interest rate is high, it pays to liquidate early and invest the proceeds in the
marketplace).
*
*
Now consider Case 2: Rbb
, which implies that a firm will be kept intact
< R < R gb

at the end of period 2 if its history of signals is {g, g }, {g, b} , or {b, g } . If the first‐period
signal was g, the judge’s problem is

{

max β 2 E (V g ), R

}

and the firm will be kept intact so long as R is less than the threshold R g* 2 , defined by

R g* 2 =

Pr (H g )

(1 + r )

2

− (1 − Pr( H g ) )

H .65

{

}

Similarly, if the first‐period signal was bad, the judge must solve max β 2 E (V b ), R and
the firm will be kept intact only if the return to creditors is below the threshold Rb*2
defined by66

64 The interest rate must satisfy the inequality

⎛ Pr( H gg ) ⎞ 1
.
1 + r ≤ ⎜⎜
− 1⎟⎟
Pr(
H
gb
)
g
Pr(
)
⎠
⎝

65 Again, this threshold imposes limits on the size r, which must satisfy the inequality

Pr( H g )
Pr( H gb)

≤ 2+r ≤

Pr( H g )

*
*
to ensure that Rbb
< R g* 2 < R gb
.
Pr( H bb)

66 The interest rate must satisfy the inequality
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⎛ Pr( H gb) ⎞ 1
1 + r ≤ ⎜⎜
.
− 1⎟⎟
⎝ Pr( H bb) ⎠ Pr (b )

Rb*2 =

Pr( H gb)

(1 + r )(1 + Pr (b )r ) − (1 − Pr( H gb) )

H.

{

}

*
*
*
, Rb*2 , R g* 2 , R gb
, Rb*1 , R g*1 , R gg
, we can determine how
Given these thresholds, Rbb

the probability of liquidation varies over the course of a case. Assume that the going‐
concern value of a firm seeking Chapter 11 protection is at least equal to its liquidation
value ( R 0 ). That is, β 3 E (V ) ≥ R 0 , or

R0 ≤

p

(1 + r )3 − (1 − p )

H,

which implies that the probability of liquidation is zero at the beginning of period 1.
This assumption also implies that R 0 < R *g1 < R *gg because p < Pr (H gg ) , that R 0 < R g* 2
*
because p < Pr (H g ) , and that R 0 > Rbb
because p > Pr (H bb ) . It is unclear, however,
*
because p
whether the liquidation value R 0 is greater or less than the threshold R gb

may be greater or less than Pr (H gb ) .
*
Suppose first that R 0 > R gb
. Given that R 0 < R *g1 < R *gg , a firm will be shut down

at the end of period 1 only if the judge received a bad signal, which will occur with
probability Pr(b) = π

bH

p +π

bL

(1 − p ) . Liquidation will occur at the end of period 2 only

if the judge receives a good first‐period signal followed by a bad second‐period signal.
Given that a firm was not liquidated at the end of period 1, the probability that it will
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broadcast a bad signal in period 2 is
Pr(b g ) = π

bH

Pr (H g ) + π

bL

(1 − Pr (H g )) ,

which is smaller than Pr(b) because Pr (H g ) > p and π

bH

<π

bL

. A similar argument

shows that the probability of liquidation at the end of period three, Pr(b gg ) , is less than
both Pr(b) and Pr(b g ) . Hence the probability of liquidation rises during the first period
and falls thereafter.
*
*
. We know that Rbb
Now suppose R 0 < R gb
< R 0 < R *g 2 , but R 0 may be greater or

less than Rb*2 . Assume first that R 0 > Rb*2 . This means that firms with bad first‐period
signals will be liquidated. Firms with good‐period signals will be kept intact at the end
of the first period and all subsequent periods. In this case, the probability of liquidation
is Pr(b) at the end of period 1 and zero thereafter. Thus the hazard of liquidation is
hump‐shaped, rising in the first period and falling thereafter.
Now suppose that R 0 < Rb*2 , implying that firms with bad first‐period signals
will be kept intact. No firm will be liquidated at the end of period 1; all liquidations will
occur at the end of the second and third periods. The probability of liquidation at the
end of the second period is Pr(b b) = π

bH

Pr (H b ) + π

bL

(1 − Pr (H b )) . For firms that

survive past the second period, the probability of liquidation is Pr( L E ) , where

44

E = gg ∪ gb ∪ bg . In this case, it is unclear whether Pr( L E ) is greater or less than
Pr(b b) . The hazard of shutdown, then, may not be hump‐shaped for firms with very

low liquidation values. For these firms, there is a strong incentive to wait until full
information is available.
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FIGURES
Figure 1
Months to Exit: Shutdowns and Continuations
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Figure 2
Monthly Hazard Rate: Shutdowns and Continuations
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TABLES

Table 1
Sample Selection
Initial sample
Deletions or consolidations:
Business filings by individual debtors
Single asset real estate cases
Non‐business filings by individuals
Firms using Ch. 11 to sell assets or settle a dispute
Sister companies
Firms dead on arrival
Publicly traded companies
Insufficient information
Simultaneous involuntary petition
Final sample

48

Petitions
184
30
22
12
8
7
5
2
2
1
95

Firms

91

Table 2
Firm Characteristics: Sample versus Corporations in 1998 Survey of Small Business Finance
(SSBF), excluding farming, mining, and real estate
Category
N.D. IL
SSBF
Fewer than 20 employees, %
83.9
83.1
Age in years, median (mean)
6.9
13.0
(12.6)
(13.7)
Assets $, median (mean)
114,160
320,971
(664,540)
(713,1023)
Debt $, median (mean)
511,752
191,660
(2,429,858)
(462,848)
Leverage (Debt/Assets)
3.37
.59
(16.82)
(.65)
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), %
Construction (15‐17)
12.6
11.2
Primary Manufacturing (20‐39)
10.5
11.7
4.2
3.3
Transportation (40‐46, 48)
Wholesale Trade (4813, 50‐51)
3.2
11.3
Retail Trade (52‐59)
11.6
15.2
Eating and Drinking Places (58)
16.8
3.6
Insurance Agents and Real Estate (60‐69)
3.1
2.7
Business Services (47, 49, 70‐79)
21.1
23.9
Professional Services (80‐89)
16.8
17.1
Note: reported means for the SSBF sample are estimates of population averages and were computed
using survey weights. Reported medians are the 50th percentile of the raw, unweighted data.
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Business category
marked on face sheet
Debt under $1 million
Assets under $1 million
Less than 20 employees

Table 3
Industry Demographics Across Select Studies,
N.D. IL, before sam‐
Warren &
N.D. IL (%)
ple selection (%)
Westbrook (%)
68.4
65.7
81.1
80.0
83.9
88.2

Farming
Professional
Retail/Wholesale
Railroad
Transportation
Manufacturing/Mining
Stockbroker
Commodity Broker
Construction
Real Estate
Other or unspecified
Jurisdictions studied
Types of cases

.
5.3
20.0
.
1.1
4.2
.
.
7.4
.
62.1
N.D. Ill.
Corp. Ch. 11

.
3.5
12.8
.
1.2
2.3
.
.
5.2
9.3
65.7
N.D. Ill.
Business
Ch. 11

103
1998

173
1998

Number of cases
Study year
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1.6
3.7
15.6
.03
2.3
2.5
.07
.2
7.5
7.3
59.2
23 Districts
Business Ch. 11
(assets/debt); busi‐
ness Ch. 7, 11, or 13
(other)
Varies (787 to 2981)
1996

1998‐99
AO Data (%)
67.1
71.4
84.1
1.7
3.6
18.4
2.7
6.5
.2
.
5.6
13.7
47.7
All districts
Corp. Ch. 11

23,671
1998

Table 4
Case Dispositions
Panel A: Legal and Economic Outcomes (frequencies)
Legal Outcomes
Economic Outcomes
Reorganization
Dismissal
Conversion to Chapter 7
Totals
Continuations:
Exited with new capital structure
23
4
27
Going‐concern sale
4
4
1
9
Totals
27
8
1
36
Shutdowns:
Shutdown before exiting bankruptcy
9
19
28
Exited without new capital structure
31
31
Totals
0
40
19
59
Panel B: Legal outcomes across jurisdictions, using AO Data (%)
Conversion to Chapter 7
Sample
Reorganization
Dismissal
N.D. IL cases, 1998‐99 (n=470)
33.2
43.6
23.2
All jurisdictions, 1998‐99 (n=13,457)
30.7
29.9
39.4
Note: Panel B statistics are derived from data on voluntary Chapter 11 cases that terminated in 1998 and involved
corporations that had assets worth less than $10 million and were not classified as farming, real estate, or stockbro‐
ker. The data were gathered by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
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Table 5
Post‐Bankruptcy Experience of Firms that Exited Without
a New Capital Structure (n=31)
Date of shutdown
Frequency
Cumulative %
Before exiting bankruptcy
10
32.3
Within 6 months of exiting
8
58.1
Within 1 year of exiting
5
74.2
Within 2 years of exiting
1
77.4
More than 2 years after exiting
7
100.0
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Table 6
Duration of Chapter 11 Cases
Panel A
Duration to confirmation, conversion, or dismissal
1 month or less
3 months or less
6 months or less
9 months or less
12 months or less

% all cases
(N=95)
4.2
31.6
51.6
76.8
81.1

% continuations
(N=36)
0.0
11.1
19.4
58.3
63.9

% shutdowns
(N=59))
6.8
44.1
71.2
88.1
91.5

Median duration (months)
5.7
8.3
3.4
Panel B
Duration to case closure (months)
All cases
Reorganizations
Dismissals
Conversions
N.D. IL cases closed during FY 1998‐99:
Median duration
18.9
21.4
12.0
51.1
% of 1998‐99 filings closed within 12 months
31.1%
% of 1998 filings closed within 24 months
57.9%
All cases closed during FY 1998‐99:
Median duration
27.6
29.4
9.4
49.7
% 1998‐99 filings closed within 12 months
23.4%
45.1%
% 1998 filings closed within 24 months
Note: Panel B statistics are derived from data on voluntary Chapter 11 cases that terminated in 1998 and involved
corporations that had assets worth less than $10 million and were not classified as farming, real estate, or stockbro‐
ker. The data were gathered by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts.
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Table 7
Party Responsible for Shutdown Motions
Panel A: Party filing final, successful shutdown motion
Debtor
Filed after court granted creditor’s lift‐stay motion
Other cases
Total
U.S. Trustee
Filed after court granted creditor’s lift‐stay motion
Other cases
Total
Creditors
Filed successful shutdown motion
Filed lift‐stay motion, inducing another party’s shutdown motion
Total
U.S. Trustee or Creditor, including cases in which debtor acted in
response to successful lift‐stay motion
Panel B: Total number of motions filed in a case
1
By trustee
% shutdowns (n=59)
55.9
% continuations (n=36)
16.7
% all cases (n=95)
41.0
By creditors
% shutdowns (n=59)
32.2
% continuations (n=36)
33.3
% all cases (n=95)
32.3
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% Shutdowns (n=59)
15.3
17.0
32.3
20.3
40.7
61.0
6.8
35.6
42.4
83.1
2 or more

At least 1

5.1
5.6
5.3

61.0
22.3
46.3

35.5
25.1
31.6

67.7
58.4
63.9

Table 8
Post‐Bankruptcy Experience of Firms that Exited with New Capital Structure (n=27)
Based on Annual Reports
Based on Annual Reports
and Other Sources
Number
Cumulative %
Number
Cumulative %
Failed within 1 year
6
3
22.2
11.1
Failed within 2 years
10
8
37.0
29.6
Failed within 3 years
13
12
48.2
44.4
Survived more than 3 years
14
15
100.0
100.0
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Table 9
Reasons for Filing Chapter 11 Petitions
Shutdowns (n=56)
% (freq)
Panel A: Evidence of Economic Distress
Ignored procedural requirements
62.5 (35)
Failed to pay ongoing expenses
26.8 (15)
Using Ch. 11 to favor insider‐creditors
1.8 (1)
Any Evidence of economic distress
78.6 (44)
Panel B: Evidence of Financial Distress
Overexpansion
Prepetition fraud or malfeasance
Cash shortages from loss of customers
Cost overruns from reconfiguring business
Asbestos liability
Any evidence of financial distress
Any evidence of financial distress, excluding
cases exhibiting economic distress

56

Shutdowns
% (freq)
8.9 (5)
3.6 (2)
10.7 (6)
3.6 (2)
0.0 (0)
26.8 (15)

Continuations
% (freq)
40.0 (14)
8.6 (3)
8.6 (3)
11.4 (4)
2.9 (1)
71.4 (25)

10.7 (6)

71.4 (25)

Table 10
Differences between cases terminating before and after median case duration
Shutdowns
All Cases
Category
Within 4
Over 4
Within 6
Over 6
Months
Months
Months
Months
Volatility, stockmarket data (U)
4.124 (.085)
4.248 (.121)
4.213 (.102)
4.289 (.093)
Volatility, SSBF data (U)
.177 (.003)
.180 (.003)
.177 (.002)
.183 (.003)^
Firm Attrition Rate, by Industry (U) 10.042 (.260)
10.524 (.244)#
10.123 (.212)
10.094 (.236)
Firm Growth Rate, by Industry (G)
1.328 (.201)
1.480 (.214)
1.211 (.171)
.975 (.180)
Overexpansion problems (G)
.118 (.056)
.24 (.087)**
.224 (.060)
.478 (.074)***
Motion to use cash collateral (G)
.235 (.074)
.640 (.098)***
.285 (.065)
.761 (.064)***
Log asset value (L)
11.079 (.311)
11.928 (.333)***
11.117 (.244)
12.491 (.271)***
Log cash holdings
6.206 (.608)
7.636 (.669)^
6.560 (.492)
8.183 (.488)**
Leverage (log debt/log assets)
1.166 (.026)
1.143 (.027)^
1.169 (.026)
1.118 (.017)
Secured debt ≥ 75% of asset value
.618 (.085)
.560 (.101)*
.673 (.068)
.304 (.069)***
Any debt personally guaranteed
.903 (.054)
.96 (.040)
.933 (.038)
.848 (.054)#
Under 5 years old
.529 (.087)
.240 (.054)**
.490 (.072)
.174 (.057)***
Proceeding without lawyer
.088 (.049)
0.0 (0.0)^
.061 (.035)
.022 (.022)
Prior bankruptcy within 6 years
.176 (.066)
.160 (.075)
.163 (.053)
.130 (.050)
Prior bankruptcy during 1998
.059 (.041)
.040 (.040)
.062 (.035)
.022 (.022)
Incomplete financial schedules
.206 (.070)
0.0 (0.0)**
.163 (.053)
0.0 (0.0)***
Notes: Parentheses contain p‐values. The symbols ***, **, *, and ^ indicate that the differences are signifi‐
cant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, respectively, using 2‐tailed t‐tests. The symbols ## and # indicate
differences that are significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, using 1‐tailed t‐tests.
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Table 11
Differences between shutdowns and continuations
All Cases
Category
Shutdowns
Continuations
Volatility, stockmarket data (U)
4.177 (.070)
4.369 (.140)#
Volatility, SSBF data (U)
.178 (.002)
.182 (.003)
Firm Attrition Rate, by Industry (U)
10.246 (.183)
9.885 (.286)
Firm Growth Rate, by Industry (G)
1.393 (.146)
.611 (.201)***
Overexpansion/adjustment problems (G)
.119 (.042)
.472 (.084)***
Motion to use cash collateral (G)
.407 (.065)
.694 (.078)***
Log asset value (L)
11.458 (.232)
12.341 (.387)**
Log cash holdings
6.819 (.457)
8.187 (.542)*
Leverage (log debt/log assets)
1.155 (.019)
1.126 (.027)
Secured debt ≥ 75% of asset value
.593 (.065)
.333 (.080)**
Any debt personally guaranteed
.929 (.035)
.829 (.065)^
Under 5 years old
.407 (.065)
.222 (.070)*
Proceeding without lawyer (pro se)
.051 (.029)
.028 (.028)
Prior bankruptcy within preceding 6 years
.169 (.049)
.111 (.053)
Prior bankruptcy during 1998
.051 (.029)
.028 (.028)
Incomplete financial schedules
.102 (.040)
0.0 (0.0)**
Notes: Parentheses contain standard errors. The symbols ***, **, *, and ^ indicate that the differences are sig‐
nificant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% levels, respectively, using 2‐tailed t‐tests. The symbols ## and # indicate
differences that are significant at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively, using 1‐tailed t‐tests.
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Industry volatility, stock data (U)
Industry volatility, SSBF data (U)
Industry attrition rate (U)
Industry growth rate (G)
Overexpansion problems (G)
Cash collateral motions (G)
Log assets (L)
Log cash holdings
Log leverage
Secured debt ≥ 75% of assets
Debt personally guaranteed
Under 5 years old
Without lawyer (pro se)
Prior bankruptcy
Prior bankruptcy in 1998
Incomplete schedules

I
‐0.332
(0.170)
‐4.574
(0.647)
‐0.191*
(0.056)
‐0.034
(0.809)
‐0.409
(0.292)
‐0.847**
(0.024)
‐0.162
(0.168)

Table 12
Models of the Shutdown Decision in Chapter 11
II
III
IV
V
‐0.359^
‐0.514*
‐0.565*
‐0.229^
(0.129)
(0.099)
(0.067)
(0.102)

‐0.174**
(0.046)
‐0.038
(0.787)
‐0.469
(0.240)
‐0.838**
(0.024)
‐0.157
(0.175)

‐0.384***
(0.001)
‐0.182
(0.395)
‐0.589
(0.239)
‐0.745*
(0.086)
‐0.425
(0.125)
‐0.155**
(0.021)
‐4.586**
(0.031)
0.625
(0.224)
‐0.070
(0.937)
0.735
(0.101)
2.342*
(0.064)
0.988**
(0.015)
0.838
(0.276)
0.352
(0.661)

‐0.354***
(0.002)
‐0.168
(0.433)
‐0.629
(0.200)
‐0.556
(0.169)
‐0.460*
(0.099)
‐0.145**
(0.024)
‐4.801**
(0.023)
0.509
(0.299)
‐0.008
(0.993)
0.688
(0.120)
2.574
(0.107)
0.927**
(0.027)

0.451
(0.624)

59

‐0.142***
(0.002)
‐0.095
(0.286)
‐0.316
(0.133)
‐0.344*
(0.078)
‐0.147
(0.131)
‐0.071**
(0.012)
‐1.498
(0.118)
0.294
(0.166)
‐0.084
(0.806)
0.267
(0.164)
1.042***
(0.007)
0.432*
(0.060)
0.359
(0.316)
0.027
(0.936)

VI
‐0.435^
(0.101)

VII
0.300*
(0.087)

VIII
0.380**
(0.017)

IX
‐1.797**
(0.028)

‐0.389***
(0.001)
‐0.232
(0.241)
‐0.528
(0.283)
‐0.608
(0.149)
‐0.442*
(0.051)
‐0.148**
(0.028)
‐4.456**
(0.019)
0.603
(0.227)
‐0.222
(0.788)
0.579
(0.132)
2.427**
(0.023)
1.078***
(0.004)
0.770
(0.306)
0.116
(0.897)

0.115**
(0.038)
0.084
(0.381)
0.392*
(0.070)
0.413**
(0.028)
0.119
(0.208)
0.076***
(0.006)
1.006
(0.349)
‐0.283
(0.180)
0.021
(0.948)
‐0.276
(0.198)
‐1.075***
(0.002)
‐0.489
(0.145)
‐0.251
(0.534)
‐0.000
(1.000)

0.095*
(0.092)
0.020
(0.844)
0.525**
(0.020)
0.502**
(0.011)
0.117
(0.233)
0.078***
(0.009)
1.061
(0.320)
‐0.379*
(0.071)
0.035
(0.919)
‐0.290
(0.200)
‐1.097***
(0.003)
‐0.471
(0.189)
‐0.191
(0.645)
‐0.032
(0.927)

0.285
(0.284)
1.472***
(0.000)
‐2.095***
(0.008)
‐2.644***
(0.003)
0.024
(0.935)
‐0.107
(0.403)
‐5.216*
(0.062)
1.860**
(0.019)
1.297
(0.269)
0.334
(0.689)
‐2.458
(0.160)
‐1.124
(0.185)
0.597
(0.672)

Table 12, continued
Models of the Shutdown Decision in Chapter 11
VIII
IX
Y
Y
89
86
Duration‐
Logit
Cure
Distribution
Cox
Cox
Cox
Cox
Exponential
Weibull
Lognormal
Lognormal
Notes: Parentheses contain robust p‐values, clustering on firm identity. The symbols ***, **, *, and ^ indicate that the differences are significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, and 15% lev‐
els, respectively.
Including repeat filings?
N
Model

I
Y
59
Hazard

II
Y
59
Hazard

III
Y
54
Hazard

IV
Y
51
Hazard
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V
Y
54
Hazard

VI
Y
54
Hazard

VII
N
54
Duration

